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Abstract
Over the past decade, great progress has been made in the static modular veri-
fication of C code by means of separation logic-based program logics. However,
the runtime guarantees offered by such verification are relatively limited when
the verified modules are part of a whole program that also contains unverified
modules. In particular, a memory safety error in an unverified module can cor-
rupt the runtime state, leading to assertion failures or invalid memory accesses
in the verified modules. This paper develops runtime checks to be inserted at
the boundary between the verified and the unverified part of a program, to guar-
antee that no assertion failures or invalid memory accesses can occur at runtime
in any verified module. One of the key challenges is enforcing the separation
logic frame rule, which we achieve by checking the integrity of the footprint of
the verified part of the program on each control flow transition from the unver-
ified to the verified part. This in turn requires the presence of some support
for module-private memory at runtime. We formalize our approach and prove
soundness. We implement the necessary runtime checks by means of a pro-
gram transformation that translates C code with separation logic annotations
into plain C, and that relies on a protected module architecture for providing
module-private memory and restricted module entry points. Benchmarks show
the performance impact of this transformation depends on the choice of bound-
ary between the verified and unverified parts of the program, but is below 4%
for real-world applications.
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Abstract
Over the past decade, great progress has been made in the static
modular verification of C code by means of separation logic-based
program logics. However, the runtime guarantees offered by such
verification are relatively limited when the verified modules are part
of a whole program that also contains unverified modules. In partic-
ular, a memory safety error in an unverified module can corrupt the
runtime state, leading to assertion failures or invalid memory ac-
cesses in the verified modules. This paper develops runtime checks
to be inserted at the boundary between the verified and the unveri-
fied part of a program, to guarantee that no assertion failures or in-
valid memory accesses can occur at runtime in any verified module.
One of the key challenges is enforcing the separation logic frame
rule, which we achieve by checking the integrity of the footprint of
the verified part of the program on each control flow transition from
the unverified to the verified part. This in turn requires the pres-
ence of some support for module-private memory at runtime. We
formalize our approach and prove soundness. We implement the
necessary runtime checks by means of a program transformation
that translates C code with separation logic annotations into plain
C, and that relies on a protected module architecture for providing
module-private memory and restricted module entry points. Bench-
marks show the performance impact of this transformation depends
on the choice of boundary between the verified and unverified parts
of the program, but is below 4% for real-world applications.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Verification
Keywords separation logic; verification; runtime checking
1. Introduction
The construction of reliable software in unsafe languages like C
or C++ is known to be challenging. Yet, because of the excellent
performance of these languages, and because they can give the
programmer access to low-level details of the machine on which
the program is executing, they are often the languages of choice for
infrastructural software such as hypervisors, operating systems and
servers, and for embedded software.
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One way of significantly increasing assurance in the reliability
of software is the use of program verification. Over the past decade,
program verification technology for C-like programming languages
has reached a level of maturity that makes it possible to verify real-
world software, albeit with considerable effort. Two high-profile
examples are the verification of Microsoft’s hypervisor Hyper-V
using the VCC verifier [10], and the verification of seL4 [23], a
microkernel of the L4 family. But there are many other examples
of projects that formally verify the safety and/or functional correct-
ness of (parts of) C programs.
For large systems, it is essential that the verification technique
used is modular. Each module (for instance each function) is ver-
ified to comply with its specification, relying only on the speci-
fication of the other modules that the verified module is interact-
ing with. Several sound modular verification tools for C have been
proposed [9, 21]. However, the soundness properties of these ver-
ifiers have an important limitation. To the best of our knowledge,
all soundness results for modular C verifiers have the form: un-
der the condition that all modules of a program have been verified,
any execution of that program will comply with the specification.
In other words, as soon as there is one unverified module, all bets
are off. The implementations of modules that are not verified are
part of the trusted computing base; it is assumed that they comply
with the specifications for these modules that were used to verify
the verified part of the program. Such assumptions are particularly
troublesome for memory-unsafe languages such as C, as a single
memory-safety error (such as a buffer overflow) in one unverified
module can in principle mess up the runtime state of all modules.
This has several undesirable consequences:
• While testing a partially verified program, failures may still
occur in the verified part of the program, and the root cause
for such failures may be hard to track down. This includes
both memory safety failures (e.g. dereferencing invalid memory
addresses) as well as failures of assertions that were statically
verified to hold.
• Security properties verified to hold in a module are not guaran-
teed to hold when that module is used as part of a larger, unveri-
fied program. Hence, the benefits of partial verification for secu-
rity purposes are limited. In particular, in a security setting, one
must consider that memory safety errors may be exploited by
means of code injection attacks [13]. Maintaining the integrity
of a verified module in such a setting is very challenging.
What is needed is a technique for ensuring that failures cannot
occur in the verified part of the program. Any runtime error should
either (1) lead to a failure in the unverified part, or (2) be detected
on entry to the verified part. This will entail that the state of the
verified module is always valid, and that no properties that were
verified to hold for this module state will ever be violated.
The approach we suggest is based on performing runtime checks
at the boundary between the verified and unverified part of the pro-
gram. While sound approaches for such dynamic contract check-
ing exist for safe languages [14, 15], to the best of our knowledge
there is no system that achieves such sound contract checking for
unsafe languages such as C. Furthermore, existing approaches in-
strument each memory access in the unverified part [28] or verified
part [33], entailing a large performance cost, while we will perform
our checks only when crossing the verified-unverified boundary.
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a pro-
gram transformation that, given a C program partitioned into an
unverified module and a module verified by means of separation
logic, transforms the verified module into a hardened module that
includes sound and complete runtime checks at the boundaries of
the module. A key problem that needs to be solved is how to make
sure that memory errors (or alternatively, malicious code) in the un-
verified part cannot corrupt the state of the verified module, while
still only performing explicit checks at the boundary. We solve this
problem in two steps. First, the boundary checks perform integrity
checks on the heap footprint of the verified module: on re-entry
to the verified module, we check that the heap memory “owned”
by the verified part has not been changed by the unverified part of
the program. This ensures that bad writes to the heap performed
by the unverified part are detected. Second, we need a mechanism
for protecting the integrity of local variables and control flow meta-
data of the verified module. For this, we rely on the recent work on
protected module architectures (PMAs), which are low-level secu-
rity architectures providing support for module-private data regions
and restricted module code entry points. Early prototypes [25, 34]
are hypervisor-based [36], while the most recent research proto-
types [29] implement this protection in hardware, thereby reducing
the trusted computing base to just the processor itself. Intel recently
announced hardware support for PMA’s under the name Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX) [19], hence this type of protection
mechanisms will be broadly available in the near future.
The combination of the module boundary checks and the PMA
protection of local variables and control flow gives us a very strong
modular soundness guarantee: no verified assertion in the verified
module will ever fail at runtime, even if the module runs as part of
a vulnerable application that is subject to code injection attacks.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• The development of runtime checks for separation logic con-
tracts at the boundary between a verified and an unverified part
of a C program.
• A formal correctness proof of these runtime checks.
• The observation that existing fully abstract secure compilation
techniques [2, 30] to a PMA ensure the soundness of these
runtime checks even in the presence of code injection attacks
exploiting memory safety errors in the unverified part.
• The development of a robust prototype, based on the Veri-
Fast [21] verifier.
• The quantification of the performance cost of the technique by
means of micro and macro benchmarks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we elab-
orate on the problem we solve and on our proposed solution in
Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 gives an informal explanation of our
program transformations, and Section 5 illustrates them using an
example program. Section 6 formalizes the transformations and
proves them correct. In Section 7 we discuss our prototype imple-
mentation and the results of our benchmarks. Finally, we discuss
related work in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.
2. Problem Statement
We assume as given a separation logic-based program logic for
C [32], and a sound modular static verifier that checks compliance
of C functions with contracts expressed in the program logic. For
concreteness, we work in this paper with the VeriFast verifier [21],
but our results are not specific to VeriFast. We use VeriFast syntax
in our examples: separating conjunction is written as &*&, and ?x
introduces an existentially quantified logic variable.
For programs in which each function is statically verified and
where the main function has an empty precondition, verification
ensures that no routine ever performs an illegal memory operation
and each routine upholds its contract. However, verifying the entire
code base of a program is often infeasible, for instance because
it is too costly in terms of programmer effort. Trying to prove
full program correctness properties for partially verified programs
would clearly be overambitious, since there are no guarantees about
the behavior of the unverified parts. However, as this section will
point out, even statements concerned only with the verified parts
of the program cannot be proven in general for partially verified
programs written in memory unsafe languages.
We consider single-threaded C programs consisting of two
parts: an unverified context and a statically verified module. Each
function of the verified module and each function prototype used
by it specifies a separation logic contract, consisting of a precon-
dition (requires) and a postcondition (ensures). Static verification
ensures that the verified functions are memory safe and comply
with their specifications, but only under the assumption that the
precondition holds on function entry and that any function called
from those functions complies to its own specification.
// Prototypes
int med(struct lst *l);
// Unverified functions
int main()
{
struct lst *l =
read_list();
print(med(l));
}
void srt(struct lst *l)
{
< unverified sort
implementation >
}
// Prototypes
void srt(struct lst *l);
req list(l, ?v0);
ens list(l, ?v1) &*&
val_eq(v0, v1) &*&
sorted(v1);
// Verified functions
int med(struct lst *l)
req list(l, ?v0) &*&
0 < length(v0);
ens list(l, v0) &*&
res == median(v0);
{
int s = len(l);
struct lst *l0 = copy(l);
srt(l0);
<proof statements>
return nth(l0, s/2);
}
Consider the example program shown above. On the left is the
context, consisting of a main function, a srt function and a proto-
type for a function med. On the right is the verified module, which
contains the function med and a prototype for srt. The med function
takes as input a non-empty list and claims that, after execution, the
list still contains the original values and the return value will be the
median of the input list. This function relies on functions len, nth
and srt to perform its task. The verifier relies on the contracts of
those functions, in addition to the proof statements in med itself, to
prove that the function will uphold its contract. The implementation
of len and nth is not shown in the example, but they are assumed
to be part of the verified module, hence the verifier can verify those
functions as well. On the other hand, for the srt function the veri-
fied module only contains a prototype. Hence the verifier can only
assume that its implementation will uphold the specified contract.
Linking the two parts of the example program together and exe-
cuting them may still lead to violations of the verified module spec-
ifications, if one of the functions has a bug. We say that a function
has a bug if it does not comply with its contract. That is, there ex-
ists an execution of the function that satisfies its precondition, but
exhibits an invalid memory access, violates the postcondition, or
performs another function call and violates the precondition of the
called function. We assume that the static verifier is sound, i.e., it
rejects any function with a bug. Hence there are only bugs in the
unverified context, not in the verified module.
For instance, if read_list (called from main) has a bug and re-
turns an invalid (e.g., unallocated) memory address, the len func-
tion or some other verified function could perform an illegal mem-
ory operation. Likewise, if srt has a bug and violates the contract
specified in its function prototype, then the verified function med
might not uphold its contract either. Furthermore, because C is a
memory unsafe language, srt can write to arbitrary memory loca-
tions, thereby modifying data belonging to the med function. For
instance, srt could write to the original list l, instead of the copy
l0 that it was given. Hence, any properties verified to hold by the
verifier about l while verifying med might be violated at runtime af-
ter a call to the unverified function srt. Note that srt can also read
memory that it is not allowed to by its contract. This is also a bug,
but it will not violate any property of the verified module assumed
by the verifier, hence our runtime checks will allow this.
How bad the effects of bugs in the unverified part of the program
can be, depends on how the program is executed. A safe execution
performs complete runtime checking and will detect bugs as soon
as they appear. Nguyen et al. [28] propose a way to perform such
executions. Every memory access is checked and contracts are
checked on each function entry and exit. Hence, safe executions
are expensive. It is sound to remove the runtime checks from the
verified module, as the soundness of verification implies that these
checks will never fail in the safe execution. But as long as there is
a significant unverified part, the performance cost will be high.
Because of this performance cost, executions of C programs are
usually not safe. Hence, executions can enter an error state and
continue executing. We say an execution is in an error state if it
has performed memory accesses resulting in undefined behavior
according to C semantics or if the execution has violated some of
the separation logic specifications. An execution can only enter an
error state in a function with a bug. That function is the root cause
of the error state. An execution fails at the point where it detects the
error state and terminates. Safe executions fail immediately at the
root cause of a bug, but other executions may continue after enter-
ing an error state. Typically what happens then is implementation-
dependent: the program behavior depends on details of the com-
piler and the machine on which the compiled code is executed.
Most C compilers will generate code that may detect some error
states such as the dereference of a memory address that the oper-
ating system has not even allocated to the program. But in general,
failure of the execution may happen long after going into an error
state. As a consequence, executions may enter an error state in the
unverified context, but then fail in the verified module. The verified
module may also be operating while in an error state, yet not fail,
and possibly further mess up the runtime state and worsen the error
state of the execution. This is exactly why partial verification is less
useful than it could be, as discussed in the introduction.
Our approach is to develop efficient runtime checks to be in-
serted at the boundary between verified and unverified code, that
make sure that no failures can occur in the verified module. Exe-
cutions can enter an error state while executing in the unverified
context and the execution may then continue in an error state, but
we have the guarantee that any error state that might impact the
verified module will be detected before control flow enters the ver-
ified module. As a consequence, we have that the execution never
fails while control is inside the verified module.
3. Overview of our solution
To guarantee that error states never impact verified modules, we
need to model the execution of programs with memory safety
errors. We describe two such models below.
3.1 Control-flow safe execution
The control-flow safe execution models programs as commands
that operate on a heap. This is a standard model of unsafe impera-
tive programs in the separation logic literature [32]. Memory safety
errors may impact any part of the heap, but they cannot modify
local variables or the control flow. In other words, code-injection
attacks or stack smashing are not modeled.
For the control-flow safe execution, it is sufficient to perform
runtime checks at the boundary between the verified module and
the unverified context. Roughly speaking, the checks that need to be
performed at the boundary are the following. Each function of the
verified module should (1) check that its precondition holds on en-
try from an unverified function, (2) check that the callee’s postcon-
dition holds after an outcall (i.e., a call from the verified module to
an unverified function), and (3) ensure that unverified functions did
not modify any heap locations that could affect the verified func-
tion’s correct execution. In our approach, the first two checks are
based on a translation of separation logic pre- and postconditions
into equivalent C code that will check the validity of those condi-
tions at runtime. For the third check, our approach keeps track of
the footprint of the verified module, i.e., the memory locations that
the module can read or write, and it uses an integrity check to en-
sure that unverified functions do not modify the contents of those
locations (except for the locations explicitly allowed by the precon-
dition of the called unverified function). Right before performing a
call from a verified function to a function of the unverified con-
text, a cryptographic checksum is calculated over the contents of
the verified module’s footprint, which is recalculated and compared
against the original on re-entry of the verified module.
We develop a program transformation on the verified module
that injects the necessary runtime checks in Section 4, and we prove
them correct for the control-flow safe execution of programs in
Section 6.
3.2 Unsafe execution
Of course, for most realistic C compilers, the control-flow safe ex-
ecution model is too abstract. Control flow information and local
variables (i.e., the runtime stack) are stored in the same memory
space as the heap, and hence memory safety errors can also mod-
ify control flow or contents of local variables. This is particularly
relevant if we consider the possibility that our program might be
under attack, and an adversary provides input that triggers a mem-
ory safety error in the unverified part of the program by performing
one of the many possible low level attacks against C programs [13].
Hence, we also consider unsafe executions, where programs are
compiled in the standard way to a Von Neumann style processor
architecture. Under such unsafe executions, the boundary checks
discussed above are insufficient, as memory safety errors might
corrupt the integrity checksum that the boundary checks compute.
Also corruption of the control flow or of local variables in the
verified functions may lead to failures in the verified module.
To restore the property that no failures occur in the verified mod-
ule, we build on a recently proposed fully abstract secure compila-
tion technique towards protected module architectures [2, 30]. This
compilation technique protects modules from a potentially mali-
cious context and ensures that any possible effect that the mali-
cious context can have on the hardened module can be understood
at source code level. By composing this secure compilation tech-
nique with the program transformation for the control-flow safe ex-
ecution, we get the desired property that no failures can occur in
the verified module, even in the presence of stack-smashing, code
injection attacks or other exploitations of memory safety errors in
the unverified context.
4. Program transformations
This section describes how a verified module can be transformed
into a hardened module containing runtime boundary checks, and
how our prototype implements these checks. At an architectural
level, the hardened module can be divided into a functional part and
a boundary checking part. The former is essentially a copy of the
verified module given as input, where the separation logic contracts
and proof statements have been removed and the functions have
been given a fresh name and marked static in order to remove
them from the module’s public interface. The latter part contains
new functions and data structure definitions to actually perform
the runtime boundary checks. The hardened module is constructed
such that each transition between the context and the functional part
passes through the appropriate function of the boundary checking
part. The transformation is based solely on the source code of the
verified module and the annotated function prototypes of the unver-
ified part. Hence, the transformation does not require access to the
source code of the unverified part. The resulting hardened module
can be linked with the unverified part as-is: no recompilation of the
unverified part is necessary.
The sections below explain concretely how different kinds of
separation logic constructs can be translated into C code for check-
ing them. We assume the control-flow safe execution model, since
it is the execution model provided to us by the fully abstract com-
pilation scheme, as described in Section 3.2.
4.1 Pure assertions
Pure assertions, as opposed to spatial assertions, only reference
local variables and hence do not make claims about the heap. Such
assertions can be translated straightforwardly into a C expression,
as shown by the example below.
// Original module
int fac(int x)
req x >= 0;
ens res > 0;
{
if (x == 0) return 1;
int p = prod(x,
fac(x-1));
return p;
}
int prod(int x, int y);
req true;
ens res == x * y;
// Hardened module
// (Functional part)
static int _fac(int x) {
if (x == 0) return 1;
int p = _prod(x,
_fac(x-1));
return p;
}
// (Boundary checking part)
static
int _prod(int x, int y) {
int r = prod(x, y);
if (! (r == x * y)) trap();
return r;
}
int fac(int x) {
if (! (x >= 0)) trap();
return _fac(x);
}
All assertions in this example, i.e., the contracts of fac and
prod, are pure. In the hardened module, fac has been replaced by
an entry stub that first checks the precondition, before calling _fac,
which is a slightly modified version of the original fac. The only
functional difference is that the modified version calls the _prod
outcall stub instead of the original function prod in the context. The
outcall stub first calls prod in the context and then checks whether
the postcondition holds. If any check fails, the trap function is
called, which ends execution. The functions _prod and _fac have
been marked static to indicate they are not in the public interface
of the hardened module.
4.2 Spatial assertions
Spatial assertions describe (parts of) the heap: they indicate that
a certain memory region should contain certain values. The as-
sertions need not necessarily specify exactly what those values are,
they can instead existentially quantify over them, by binding a logic
variable (see, for instance, the logic variable bindings ?a and ?b in
the precondition of the original module in the example below). The
difficulty with spatial assertions is that a function in the context can
overwrite these values, even though that function might not be al-
lowed to do so by its contract, thereby possibly violating properties
of the verified module verified to hold by the verifier. In separa-
tion logic terms, this corresponds to a violation of the frame rule.
As described in Section 3, we use a cryptographic checksum over
the memory footprint of the hardened module to solve this problem.
// Original module
struct pair {int a, b;};
void f(struct pair* p)
req p->a |-> ?a &*&
p->b |-> ?b
ens p->a |-> _ &*&
p->b |-> _;
{
<...>
ct(p);
<...>
}
void ct(struct pair* p);
req p->a |-> ?n;
ens p->a |-> ?m &*&
m == n + 1;
// Hardened module
struct pair {int a, b;};
static
void _f(struct pair* p) {
<...>
_ct(p);
<...>
}
static
void _ct(struct pair* p) {
char h0[32], h1[32];
int n = intp(&(p->a),C);
fp_hash(h0);
ct(p);
fp_hash(h1);
if (!eq(h0, h1)) trap();
int m = intp(&(p->a),P);
if (m != n+1) trap();
}
void f(struct pair* p) {
a = intp(&(p->a),P);
b = intp(&(p->b),P);
_f(p);
intp(&(p->a),C);
intp(&(p->b),C);
}
The code above shows our approach. In the hardened module
on the right, the verified function f has been replaced by an entry
stub that first calls intp for both integer points-to assertions in the
precondition of the original f, then calls _f and finally calls intp
again for both integer points-to assertions in the postcondition.
The intp function is a data type checking function provided by
our runtime checking system. It takes as arguments a pointer p to
an integer and an enumeration value, and performs two important
functions. The function first checks whether p points to a valid in-
teger, which it does by simply reading *p. Secondly, the function
adds or removes the memory region occupied by the integer (i.e.,
the memory region of sizeof(int) bytes starting at address p)
to or from a global data structure describing the hardened module’s
footprint. When the enumeration value is P (for produce), the mem-
ory region is added to the footprint and when it is C (for consume)
the region is removed. When adding a region to the footprint, intp
checks that the region does not overlap with the existing footprint.
This corresponds to the semantics of the separating conjunction,
which requires that the footprint of each of its conjuncts occupies
a disjoint part of the heap. We do not support non-separating con-
junction but argue in Section 6.3 that this does not pose expressibil-
ity problems. If all checks pass, the intp function returns the in-
teger value at the given address, or ends execution by calling trap
otherwise. Functions similar to intp are provided for other prim-
itive data types (char, unsigned int, . . . ) and pointers, because
the memory sizes of those data types can differ.
In the function _f of the hardened module, the call to the ct
function of the context has been replaced by a call to the _ct out-
call stub. This stub first removes (consumes) the footprint of ct’s
precondition from the hardened module’s footprint, before calcu-
lating a hash over the memory regions described by the remaining
footprint. This hash is stored in the local variable h0, where it is
protected from the context by the secure compilation scheme. Next,
the stub calls ct, handing over control to the context. When the
context function returns, the outcall stub verifies that the memory
described by the footprint has not been tampered with, by recal-
culating the hash and comparing it to the original value stored in
h0. Finally, the stub checks whether the postcondition of ct holds
by producing its footprint and checking whether the values in the
corresponding memory region adhere to the contract. Note that we
do not prevent the context from reading memory it is not supposed
to by its contract, because this can never violate properties of the
verified module assumed by the verifier.
For our prototype, we implemented the footprint data structure
as a radix trie. This data structure supports O(k) addition, removal
and overlap testing, and O(n) traversal, with k the number of
bits in a memory address (e.g. 64 for a 64-bit CPU) and n the
number of memory regions in the trie. The footprint description
must be protected from being overwritten by memory safety errors
in the unverified context and hence we store it in the module-private
memory section provided by the PMA.
4.3 Predicates
Separation logic predicates are named, parameterized assertions,
used to provide data encapsulation and to describe recursive data
structures. For instance, the following predicate describes a linked
list of integers of a certain size.
struct list { int value; struct list* next; };
pred list_pred(struct list* l; int size) =
l == 0 ? size == 0 : l->value |-> _ &*& l->next |-> ?n
&*& list_pred(n, ?size0) &*& size == size0 + 1;
Predicates can have an arbitrary number of parameters and sep-
aration logic allows us to existentially quantify over each of them.
For instance, a valid precondition could be list_pred(?l, 5),
meaning that there must be a linked list of size 5 somewhere on the
heap. Translating this quantification into a runtime check would
however be problematic, since in general the entire heap would
need to be examined in order to bind a value to l at runtime. Hence,
we require predicates to be precise: predicates must separate their
parameters into input and output parameters and only output pa-
rameters can be quantified over when using a predicate. In a predi-
cate definition, each output parameter of the predicate must be as-
signed a value in all execution paths of the predicate’s body. We
discuss the implications of this requirement in Section 6.3. In Veri-
Fast syntax, parameters before the semicolon in the parameter list
of a predicate definition are input parameters and the other param-
eters are output parameters. Hence, for list_pred defined above,
l is an input parameter and size is an output parameter.
static void
list_pred(struct list* l, int* size, enum op_type op) {
if (l == 0) { *size = 0; }
else {
intp(&(l->value), op);
struct list* n = ptrp(&(l->next), op);
int size0;
list_pred(n, &size0, op);
*size = size0 + 1;
}
}
The code above shows the transformation of the list_pred
predicate. It is a predicate checking function with one more pa-
rameter than the original predicate. This extra parameter is an enu-
meration value indicating whether the predicate will be used for
consumption or production and its value is simply passed on to
the data type checking functions (e.g. intp) described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Input parameters have the same type in the runtime check-
ing function as in the original predicate and output parameters
are pointers to the type of the parameter in the original predicate.
The predicate’s body is transformed straightforwardly into equiva-
lent C code. When an output parameter is assigned a value in the
predicate body, the corresponding pointer parameter in the run-
time checking function is assigned a value as well. As exempli-
fied by the recursive call to list_pred, a predicate call assertion
is transformed into a call to the corresponding predicate check-
ing function. If an assertion uses a constant value or previously
bound variable for an output argument instead of binding a new
variable (e.g. list_pred(l, s) with s already bound, instead of
list_pred(l, ?s)), then this is pre-transformed to first binding
a fresh variable to the output parameter and then constraining it
with an equality (e.g. list_pred(l, ?s0) &*& s0 == s). This
allows the core transformation to assume that output arguments are
always existentially quantified.
4.4 Inductive data types
While spatial assertions and predicates are in some cases sufficient
to prove memory safety, they are insufficient to prove full func-
tional correctness for most programs. For instance, the list_pred
predicate defined in the previous section specifies the size and
memory footprint of a linked list, but does not say anything about
its contents. VeriFast supports a rich specification language with
inductive data types and fixpoint functions (i.e., primitive recursive
functions) over them. The example below shows how such con-
structs can be used for specifying functional correctness properties.
induct ints = ints_nil() | ints_cons(int, ints);
pred list_pred(struct list* l; ints values) =
l == 0 ?
values == ints_nil()
:
l->value |-> ?v &*& l->next |-> ?n &*&
list_pred(n, ?vs_tail) &*&
values == ints_cons(v, vs_tail);
fixpoint int head(ints lst) {
switch (lst) {
case ints_nil(): return 0;
case ints_cons(v, tail): return v;
}
}
int get_first(struct list* l)
req list_pred(l, ?values);
ens list_pred(l, values) &*& res == head(lst);
{
<implementation omitted>
}
The behavior of get_first is completely specified by its contract.
Our transformation translates such inductive data type specifica-
tions into tagged structures, a known technique for implementing
variant types in C. The code below shows the data structure defini-
tions corresponding to ints and its two constructors.
struct ints { int tag; };
struct ints_nil {
int tag;
// No members
};
struct ints_cons {
int tag;
int _1;
struct ints* _2;
};
To prevent the context from tampering with instances of these
data structures when the context is in control, the data must either
be stored in the private memory section provided by the PMA, or
be included in the module’s footprint such that it’s incorporated in
the cryptographic checksum described in Section 4.2. We chose to
store the data in the private memory section, which is faster than the
checksum-based approach, but does require more private memory.
Besides these structure declarations, the transformation also
generates an equality comparison function for each inductive data
type. Finally, fixpoint function definitions are translated straight-
forwardly into equivalent C functions.
4.5 Function pointers
VeriFast allows programs using function pointers to be verified, by
letting users associate contracts with classes of functions. The code
below shows how a verified module can use a function pointer to
call a function in the unverified part.
typedef
int int_func(int x);
req true;
ens result > 0;
void f(int_func* g, int x)
req is_int_func(g);
ens true;
{
int y = g(x);
<...>
}
The typedef on the left defines int_func as the class of func-
tions that take an integer argument and return a strictly positive
integer result. On the right, the function f takes a pointer g to such
a function, applies it to a local variable x and stores the result in y.
The contract for g is specified by the is_int_func(g) assertion in
the precondition of f, which refers to the typedef on the left.
Our transformation handles function pointer calls almost the
same way it handles regular calls. That is, an outcall stub is gen-
erated for each defined function pointer typedef, and the hardened
module calls this outcall stub instead of calling corresponding func-
tion pointers directly. Function pointer outcall stubs take as an ar-
gument a pointer to the concrete function to call. For instance, for
the example code above, the function pointer outcall stub would be:
static int _int_func(int_func* f, int x) {
<calculate footprint hash>
int result = f(x);
<verify footprint hash, check postcondition>
return result;
}
Indirect function calls from the context to the hardened module
are also supported naturally. Since all functions of the functional
part of the hardened module have been made static, the only
publicly accessible functions of the module are those in the bound-
ary checking part. The fully abstract compilation scheme uses the
PMA’s restriction on module entry points to ensure that only those
public functions can be called from the context at runtime. Hence,
the necessary runtime checks are performed whenever the unveri-
fied part calls the hardened module through a function pointer.
5. Example program
This section uses an example program to illustrate how the trans-
formations described above affect the hardened module’s footprint
description. Figure 1 depicts the example program and the footprint
at various execution points. Note that the program is an abstract
example created to illustrate the footprint evolution under various
control flow transitions, and is not intended to model any useful
computation. The program consists of the verified functions vf1,
vf2 and vf3, and, in addition to the standard C library, two un-
verified functions main and uvf. The unverified function uvf is
annotated with a separation logic contract, so it can be called from
Figure 1. When executing the example program on the left, the
footprint evolves as shown on the right. The single-bordered boxes
on the left are unverified functions while the double-bordered boxes
are verified functions. The boxes on the right represent the heap,
with the grayed-out parts representing the hardened module’s foot-
print. Solid lines are function calls and dashed lines are returns.
the verified functions. The function signatures and contracts shown
in Figure 1 refer to a struct m and predicate chars, defined as:
struct m {
int x; int sz;
};
pred chars(char *a, int sz) =
sz <= 0 ? true :
char(a) &*& chars(a+1, sz-1);
A chars(a, sz) instance represents a character array of size
sz, starting at heap address a. The char predicate used by chars
is a VeriFast primitive which asserts that its argument points to a
valid character in memory. Its translation is a call to the charp data
type checking function (similar to intp described in Section 4.2).
We now discuss how each of the function calls shown in Fig-
ure 1 affects the hardened module’s footprint description. Assume
main allocates an array A of N bytes and an instance M of struct
m, using the standard (unverified) malloc function, and assigns the
value N to M’s sz field. At this point, the heap contains A and M
and the footprint description is empty. Next, main calls the veri-
fied function vf1(A, M), and hence this function’s entry stub will
check whether its precondition holds. The precondition check con-
sists of reading the sz field of M and verifying that A is in fact a char-
acter array of size N. As part of this check, the memory occupied
by M’s sz field and the entire array A will be added to the footprint
description. The memory occupied by M’s x field is not mentioned
in vf1’s precondition and hence is not added to the footprint de-
scription.
Next, vf1 calls vf2(a, m->sz) directly, without passing through
a boundary checking function, because both caller and callee are in
the hardened module. No runtime checks are performed and hence
the footprint description remains the same.
The vf2 function now makes an outcall uvf(a, sz), which
passes through the corresponding outcall stub. The stub first re-
moves the array A from the footprint description, because it is ref-
erenced in uvf’s precondition, and then hashes the memory in the
remaining footprint description (consisting of only the sz field of
M), before calling uvf.
We assume uvf allocates an array B of eight integers, again us-
ing the standard malloc function, and then calls vf3(B). This func-
tion’s entry stub will verify that B is a valid array of eight integers
and will add B to the footprint description. The vf3 function now
executes its (unspecified) body and then returns, thereby removing
B from the footprint description, as specified by its postcondition.
Now uvf is back in control and returns to its outcall stub in the
hardened module. The stub will first check that the memory in the
footprint (still consisting of only M’s sz field) has not been modi-
fied, by recalculating the hash and comparing it to the original. Exe-
cution is aborted if any change is detected. If the new hash matches
the original, the stub checks whether uvf’s postcondition holds and
adds the second half of A back to the footprint description, as spec-
ified by uvf’s postcondition. The stub then returns control to vf2.
Note that it is impossible that vf2 now tries to access the first half
of A, since this would have been detected by the static verifier when
verifying vf2.
The vf2 function now returns to vf1, without any change in the
footprint description, because both functions are part of the hard-
ened module. Finally, vf1 returns to main, removing the second
half of A and M’s sz field from the footprint description, as specified
by vf1’s postcondition. Control is now back at the main function
and the footprint description is empty.
6. Formalization
This section formalizes the transformations described in Section 4
and proves that they are safe and precise. Safety means that the
hardened module does not fail, even when it is interacting with a
context that does not uphold its contracts. Precision means that the
hardened module behaves exactly like the original verified module
when interacting with a context that does uphold its contracts. Fo-
cusing on the essentials of the transformation, we do not formalize
inductive data types nor function pointers.
The outline of the formalization is as follows. We first define
a simple imperative programming language that models C and de-
fine an assertion language to specify contracts on routines of this
language. Next we define, as a first step, a function prod that trans-
lates assertions to commands in our program language that check
whether those assertions hold. This function would be sufficient to
generate runtime checks for a module that does not perform any
outcalls. After proving this function’s correctness, we use it as a
building block for a more complex transformation function that
does safely support outcalls. We then prove that programs gener-
ated by this transformation function are safe and precise.
6.1 Programming language
The syntax of our formal programming language is defined in
Figure 2 and its operational semantics are described in Figure 3.
We write JeKs to indicate the value of an expression e evaluated
under a store s, assuming standard non-negative integer expression
evaluation. In addition to standard imperative language constructs
such as heap lookup, mutation, allocation and deallocation, the
language provides two assertion commands. The first is assert(b),
which asserts that the boolean expression b holds and the other is
alloced(l), which asserts that the memory address l is allocated.
Both commands evaluate to skip if the assertion succeeds and to
trap otherwise. Trapping (as opposed to failing) is a clean way of
indicating an abnormality: our runtime checks trap whenever they
discover a bug in the context. Once a program traps, it remains in
the trapped state forever (i.e., it diverges).
Program states Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | c consist of a map Σ from routine
names to routine definitions, a stack s, a heap h and the program
under execution c. The stack is a list of stores s, each of which is
a partial function from Vars to N+. The heap is a partial function
from memory locations in N+ to values in N+. Execution starts
from an empty store and heap.
We assume our programs are well-formed. That is, they never
try to use a variable that was not defined earlier in the code, and they
do not refer to undefined routines. From Figure 3 we can derive that
well-formed programs only get stuck when they try to read, write
or deallocate an unallocated memory location, which is what we
define as failure.
Definition 1 (Failure). We say a program c fails when it is stuck
(i.e., none of the evaluation rules of Figure 3 can be applied).
For well-formed programs this corresponds to reading, writing or
deallocating an unallocated memory location.
Since we prove safety for any hardened module, absence of fail-
ure according to this definition also implies absence of assertion
failures.
6.2 Separation logic
We define separation logic triples of the form {P} c {Q} and
we say such triples hold when, starting from any state (stack and
heap) that satisfies the precondition P , the command c does not fail
and any resulting state satisfies the postcondition Q. We are only
concerned with partial correctness, so c is allowed to diverge, which
is what happens when our runtime checks trap. The assertions P
and Q are defined as:
P,Q ::= b | b ? P : Q | e 7→?x | p(e, ?x) | y := e |P ∗Q |
P ∧Q |P ∨Q | ¬P | >
where booleans b and expressions e are defined as in Figure 2, p
refers to a user-defined predicate pred p(x, y) = a and ?x intro-
duces a logic variable x. The first parameter of a user-defined pred-
icate is an input parameter and the second is an output parameter.
The assignment assertion y := e is used to bind a value to predicate
output parameters. The formal semantics of this assertion language
are defined in Figure 4, where a judgment s, h  P  s′ means
that P holds under store s and heap h and binds new logic variables
(using e 7→?x and p(e, ?x)) to end up with the updated store s′.
We always assume assertions are well-formed. That is, (1) all
logic variables are distinct from program variables, (2) assertions
never refer to undefined program or logic variables and (3) asser-
tions never re-assign logic variables. These properties can always
be achieved by an alpha-renaming of logic variables.
6.3 Contract assertion language
Although assertions in our meta-theory range over the full language
defined above, routine and predicate contracts come from a more
restricted language of precise assertions.
a ::= b | b ? a : a | e 7→?x | p(e, ?x) | y := e | a ∗ a
In particular, routine and predicate assertions do not include stan-
dard conjunction, disjunction, negation nor top. Furthermore, we
require user-defined predicates to constrain their output parame-
ter to a single value (using the y := e construct) exactly once
on each possible execution path of their body, as defined in Fig-
ure 5. These requirements make existential quantification construc-
tive: assertions indicate how each variable can be assigned a value,
thereby avoiding an exhaustive search which would entail an enor-
mous runtime performance cost.
While excluding disjunction, negation and non-separating con-
junction between spatial predicates might seem to limit the expres-
siveness of the contract assertion language, this language subset
corresponds exactly to the assertion languages supported by Veri-
Fast [21], Smallfoot [5] and other separation logic-based program
verifiers [7, 12]. Extensive experience with these tools has shown
that this subset is sufficiently expressive for practical purposes [31].
In the rest of the text, we will consistently use symbols P and
Q for meta-level assertions and symbol a for contract assertions.
6.4 No outcalls
We now define a function prod(a) from assertions to commands
that models the production of a (see Section 4.2). The code gener-
ated by this function assumes there is a program variable fp con-
taining a set of memory locations that represents the hardened mod-
ule’s current footprint. Since memory locations in our program-
ming language are non-negative integers, a Gödel encoding could
be used to store this footprint. The generated code will (1) trap if a
does not hold or if its footprint would overlap with the footprint in
fp, (2) create a program variable x for each logic variable ?x in a
and (3) add the assertion’s footprint to fp. The function is defined
as follows.
prod(y := e) = (y := e)
prod(b) = assert(b)
prod(b ? a1 : a2) = if b then prod(a1) else prod(a2)
prod(e 7→?x) =
 x := e; x := in(x, fp);assert(x = 0); x := e; alloced(x);fp := add(x, fp); x := [x]
where fp is the program variable that stores the footprint, in(x, y)
returns 1 if x is in the list represented by y and 0 otherwise, and
add(x, y) adds x to the list represented by y.
prod(p(e, ?x)) = (x := e; {fp, x} := prodp(fp, x))
where prodp implements the production part of the predicate
checking routine for p, defined as routine prodp(fp, x) = prod(a);
res := {fp, y} with a the body of pred p(x, y). The {fp, x} is
syntactic sugar for a tuple consisting of fp and x.
prod(a1 ∗ a2) = prod(a1); prod(a2)
Before proving the correctness of prod, we first need a number of
auxiliary definitions and lemmas.
Definition 2 (Partial function subset). We say a partial function
f : X → Y is a subset of a (partial or total) function f ′ : X → Y ,
written f v f ′ iff ∀x ∈ dom(f) : f(x) = f ′(x).
Lemma 1. If we have 〈s, h〉 | prod(a) → 〈s′, h〉 | skip for some
s, s′, h and a, then we also have 〈s, h′〉 | prod(a)→ 〈s′, h′〉 | skip
where h v h′.
Proof. Follows from the definition of prod. Any memory location
allocated in h is also allocated in h′ and has the same value.
Lemma 2. For any s, s′, h and a such that 〈s, h〉 | prod(a) →
〈s′, h〉 | skip, we have s v s′.
Proof. Follows from our assumption of assertion preciseness and
well-formedness and the fact that prod(a) only assigns a variable
x when either (1) there is a logic variable ?x in a or (2) when a
contains an output variable assignment x := e.
Definition 3 (Assertion footprint). The footprint of an assertion a
under a store s and heap h′ is
s, h  a s′ =⇒ fps,h′(a) = dom(h)
where h v h′.
We now prove our first important property about prod(a), which
describes how this function behaves when a is valid. More pre-
cisely, Lemma 3 says that if an assertion a holds in some store s
and heap h and extends this store with new logic variables to form
the new store s′ and the footprint of a does not overlap with the
footprint in fp, then prod(a) executed from the same store s and
heap h will evaluate to skip and the resulting store will be equal
to s′. In this new store s′, the footprint fp will have been updated
with the footprint of a and concrete(a) will hold. The formal def-
inition of concrete(a) is given in Figure 6, but intuitively it means
that all occurrences of logic variables ?x in a are replaced with
corresponding program variables x, which means prod(a) has in-
troduced a program variable x for each logic variable ?x and has
assigned it the same value.
Lemma 3. For any s, h, s′ and well-formed a, we have
s, h  a s′ ∧ fps,h(a) ∩ s(fp) = ∅
⇓
〈s, h〉 | prod(a)→∗ 〈s′, h〉 | skip ∧
s′, h  concrete(a) s′ ∧ s′(fp) = s(fp) ∪ fps′,h(a)
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation of s, h  a:
• For a boolean assertion b we have prod(b) = assert(b). If
s, h  b  s′, then JbKs = true and hence prod(b) evalu-
ates to skip. Since there are no free logic variables in a, we
have concrete(a) = a which still holds in store s′ = s and
since fps,h(a) = fps′,h(a) = ∅, the footprint fp need not be
changed.
• For a = b ? a1 : a2, we have prod(a) = if b then prod(a1)
else prod(a2). Given that s, h  a  s′, we know that JbKs
evaluates to true or false. If JbKs = true, then s, h  a1  s′
holds and we have fps′,h(a) = fps′,h(a1), which we can
combine with the induction hypothesis for a1 to see that
〈s, h〉 | prod(a1)→∗ 〈s′, h〉 | skip ∧
s′, h  concrete(a1) s′ ∧ s′(fp) = s(fp) ∪ fps′,h(a1)
Still assuming JbKs = true, we know that prod(a) evalu-
ates to prod(a1) and s′, h  concrete(a)  s′ ⇔ s′, h 
concrete(a1) s′ and hence the conclusion follows. The case
for JbKs = false is symmetrical.
• For a = e 7→?x, we have prod(a) = (x := e; x :=
in(x, fp); assert(x = 0); x := e; alloced(x); fp :=
add(x, fp); x := [x]). Given that s, h  a  s′, we know
s′ = s[x → m] and JeKs = l for some memory location l
and h = l → m. We can see that fps,h(a) = {l} and given
that fps,h(a) ∩ s(fp) = ∅, we know that prod(a) will evalu-
ate to alloced(x); fp := add(x, fp); x := [x] where x has
the value l. Since l ∈ dom(h), the alloced check will pass, l
will be added to fp and x will be assigned [x] = m. Since
no program variable other than x was assigned, the updated
store will be equal to s′ and concrete(a) will hold. Finally, be-
cause of our assumption of assertion well-formedness, we have
fps′,h(a) = fps,h(a) = {l} and hence the conclusion holds.
• For a = (y := e), we have prod(a) = (y := e). Given
that s, h  a  s′, we know s′ = s[y → n] for n = JeKs.
We see that prod(a) assigns this n to the program variable y,
hence concrete(a) = (y = e) will hold in the updated store.
This store is equal to s′ because y is the only program variable
assigned. Finally, since fps,h(a) = fps′,h(a) = ∅ the footprint
s′(fp) is still up to date.
• For a = p(e, ?x), we have prod(a) = (x := e; {fp, x} :=
r(fp, x)), where the body of r is (prod(a′); res := {fp, y})
with a′ the body of predicate p(x, y). Given that s, h  a s′,
we know s′ = s[x → m] for some m. We also know that
fps,h(a) = fpspred,h(a
′) and that spred, h  a′  s′pred holds
with spred = {x → JeKs} and s′pred(y) = m. Combining this
with our induction hypothesis, we see that we have
〈spred, h〉 | prod(a′)→∗ 〈s′pred, h〉 | skip ∧
s′pred, h  concrete(a′) s′pred∧
s′pred(fp) = spred(fp) ∪ fps′
pred
,h(a
′)
Hence prod(a) will evaluate to skip. Since routine r returns
the updated footprint and the value of y, which is assigned
to x by prod(a), we see that concrete(a) = p(e, x) holds in
the updated store. Furthermore, since x is the only program
variable assigned, this updated store is equal to s′. Finally,
since fps′,h(a) = fps′
pred
,h(a
′) the footprint s′(fp) is updated
correctly as well and hence the conclusion holds.
• For the separating conjunction a = (a1 ∗ a2), we have
prod(a) = prod(a1); prod(a2). Given that s, h  a  s′′,
we know s, h1  a1  s′ and s′, h2  a2  s′′ for some h1
and h2 such that h1 ⊥ h2 and h1∪h2 = h. Using the induction
hypothesis for a1 and a2 gives us (1):
s, h1  a1  s′ ∧ fps,h1(a1) ∩ s(fp) = ∅
⇓
〈s, h1〉 | prod(a1)→∗ 〈s′, h1〉 | skip ∧
s′, h1  concrete(a1) s′ ∧ s′(fp) = s(fp) ∪ fps′,h1(a1)
and (2):
s′, h2  a2  s′′ ∧ fps′,h2(a2) ∩ s′(fp) = ∅
⇓
〈s′, h2〉 | prod(a2)→∗ 〈s′′, h2〉 | skip ∧
s′′, h2  concrete(a2) s′′ ∧ s′′(fp) = s′(fp) ∪ fps′′,h2(a2)
From h1 ⊥ h2 we know that fps,h1(a1) ∩ fps′,h2(a2) = ∅.
Combining this with fps,h(a) = fps,h1(a1) ∪ fps′,h2(a2)
and fps,h(a) ∩ s(fp) = ∅, leads to fps,h1(a1) ∩ s(fp) = ∅
and fps′,h2(a2) ∩ s′(fp) = ∅. Hence the premise and con-
clusion of (1) and (2) hold. We can apply Lemma 1 to see
〈s, h〉 | prod(a1) →∗ 〈s′, h〉 | skip and 〈s′, h〉 | prod(a2) →∗
〈s′′, h〉 | skip and hence 〈s, h〉 | prod(a1); prod(a2) →∗
〈s′′, h〉 | skip. Lemma 2 shows us that s′ ⊆ s′′ and because
we have h1 ⊥ h2 and h1 ∪ h2 = h, we also have s′′, h 
concrete(a1) ∗ concrete(a2)  s′′. And since s′′(fp) =
s′(fp) ∪ fps′′,h2(a2) and s′(fp) = s(fp) ∪ fps′,h1(a1), we
have s′′(fp) = s(fp) ∪ fps′,h1(a1) ∪ fps′′,h2(a2). Hence, the
conclusion holds.
We now reformulate this lemma as a separation logic triple:
Lemma 4. For well-formed assertions a, a′ and a ∗ a′, we have
{a ∗ a′ ∧ fp ∩ fp(a) = ∅}
prod(a)
{concrete(a) ∗ a′ ∧ fp = fpold ∪ fp(a)}
where fp(a) is the footprint of a evaluated in the current state.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3 and the separation logic frame rule.
Note that the frame rule is not sound in general for our program-
ming language, because it contains the alloced command: extend-
ing the heap can cause alloced to skip instead of trap. The frame
rule is however applicable in this specific case, because Lemma 3
shows prod(a) does not trap and hence extending the heap will not
change the behavior of alloced.
The second important property of prod states that prod(a) will trap
or diverge when the footprint of a overlaps with the footprint in fp.
Lemma 5. For any s, h and well-formed a, we have
{fp ∩ fp(a) 6= ∅} prod(a) {trap}
Proof. (sketch) The proof goes by induction on the execution
length of prod(a). When prod(a) diverges, the lemma holds im-
mediately. When it does not diverge, we can intuitively see that
the lemma holds because the only assertion that has a non-empty
footprint is e 7→?x. The footprint of this assertion is the value of e
and prod(e 7→?x) traps when the value of e is already in fp.
The third and final important property of prod states how prod(a)
behaves when a does not hold. More specifically, Lemma 6 says
that if a does not hold in some store s and heap h and the reason
that a does not hold is not because h is too large (i.e., defined for
more memory locations than the footprint of a), then prod(a) traps
or diverges.
Lemma 6. For any well-formed assertion a, we have
{¬(a ∗ >)} prod(a) {trap}
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the execution length of
prod(a). If prod(a) diverges, the lemma holds immediately be-
cause our triples only express partial correctness. If prod(a) does
not diverge we have the following case analysis on a:
• For a boolean assertion b we have prod(b) = assert(b). If
s, h  ¬(a ∗ >), then JbKs = false and hence prod(a)
evaluates to trap.
• For a = b ? a1 : a2, we have prod(a) = if b then prod(a1)
else prod(a2). Since a is well-formed, b will evaluate to true
or false. Suppose JbKs = true, then from s, h  ¬(a ∗ >) we
have s, h  ¬(a1 ∗>) and we can use the induction hypothesis
for a1 to see that {¬(a1 ∗ >)} prod(a1) {trap}. The case forJbKs = false is symmetrical and hence the lemma holds.
• For a = e 7→?x, we have prod(a) = (x := e; x :=
in(x, fp); assert(x = 0); x := e; alloced(x); fp :=
add(x, fp); x := [x]). Since a is well-formed, e will eval-
uate to some memory location l. Given that s, h  ¬(a ∗ >),
we know ¬∃n : l → n ∈ h. This means alloced(x) will trap
and hence no matter the outcome of in(x, fp), prod(a) traps.
• For a = (y := e), we have prod(a) = (y := e). Since a is
well-formed, e will evaluate to some value n. From Figure 4,
we can see that s, h  ¬(a ∗ >) can never occur and hence we
can discard this proof case.
• For a = p(e, ?x), we have prod(a) = (x := e; {fp, x} :=
r(fp, x)), where the body of r is (prod(a′); res := {fp, y})
with a′ the body of predicate p(x, y). Since a is well-formed,
we know that e will evaluate to some value n. Given that
s, h  ¬(a ∗ >), we have sa, h  ¬(a′ ∗ >) with sa =
{x → n}. We can use the induction hypothesis to see that
{¬(a′ ∗ >)} prod(a′) {trap} and hence the lemma holds.
• For a = (a1 ∗ a2), we have prod(a) = prod(a1); prod(a2). If
s, h  ¬(a ∗ >), then we have one of the follow three cases:
Case 1: s, h  ¬(a1 ∗ >), here we can immediately apply the
induction hypothesis to a1 to see that prod(a1) will trap.
Case 2: s, h  a1 ∗ >  s′ ∧ s′, h  ¬(a2 ∗ >), in this
case, if we have fps,h(a1) ∩ s(fp) = ∅, then we can apply
Lemma 3 to see that prod(a1) will evaluate to skip with a
resulting store equal to s′. We can them apply the induction
hypothesis to a2 to see that prod(a2) will trap. If however we
have fps,h(a1)∩s(fp) 6= ∅, then we can apply Lemma 5 to see
that prod(a1) will trap.
Case 3: s, h1  a1  s′ ∧ s′, h2  a2  s′′ for some h1
and h2, with h1 6⊥ h2. If we have fps,h(a1) ∩ s(fp) 6= ∅, then
we can apply Lemma 5 to see that prod(a1) will trap. If we
have fps,h(a1)∩ s(fp) = ∅, we can apply Lemma 3 to see that
prod(a1) will evaluate to skip with a resulting store equal to s′
and a footprint that now includes fps,h(a1) = dom(h1). We
can then use the fact that h1 6⊥ h2 and fps′,h(a2) = dom(h2)
and Lemma 5 to see that prod(a2) will trap.
We now summarize Lemma 4 and 6 in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For well-formed assertions a and a′, we have
{> ∗ a′ ∧ fp(a′) ⊆ fp}
prod(a)
{(> ∗ concrete(a) ∗ a′ ∧ fp = fpold ∪ fp(a)) ∨ trap}
6.5 Outcall support
We now define the additional transformation functions required
to safely perform outcalls from a hardened module to routines
of the context that might not uphold their contract. Triples now
take the form Γ ` {P} c {Q} or ∆  {P} c {Q}, where
the first form means that the static verifier asserts that, given the
function Γ mapping routine names to contracts, if P holds then c
will not fail and Q will hold after executing c. The Γ corresponds
to the prototypes of the functions of the context (including their
contracts). Triples of the latter form mean that if P holds in some
state (stack and heap), then executing c under the context ∆ won’t
fail and Q will hold in the resulting state. The ∆ corresponds to
a context, in the form of a map from routine names to routine
definitions.
Because the verifier is sound, Γ ` {P} c {Q} implies ∆ 
{P} c {Q}, under the critical condition that the routines of ∆
uphold the contracts defined in Γ. The essence of our formalization
is to show that our program transformation will allow us to discard
this critical condition.
We now define cons(a), a function that models the consumption
of an assertion. As explained in Section 4.2, this function needs
to be called right before making an outcall, to consume (remove)
the footprint of the context function’s precondition from the cur-
rent footprint fp. The structure of cons(a) is identical to that of
prod(a), but it has to remove a’s footprint instead of adding it.
Furthermore, there is no need for cons(a) to check that a actually
holds, because the static verifier already ensured this when check-
ing the verified module. Hence, we do not need to use the assert
and alloced commands in the definition of cons(). The function is
defined as follows.
cons(y := e) = (y := e)
cons(b) = skip
cons(b ? a1 : a2) = if b then cons(a1) else cons(a2)
cons(e 7→?x) = x := e; fp := rem(x, fp); x := [x]
where rem(x, y) removes x from the list represented by y.
cons(p(e, ?x)) = (x := e; {fp, x} := consp(fp, x))
where consp implements the consumption part of the predi-
cate checking routine for p, defined as routine consp(fp, x) =
cons(a); res := {fp, y}with a the body of predicate pred p(x, y)
cons(a1 ∗ a2) = cons(a1); cons(a2)
The following lemma indicates that the net effect of cons(a) is
the concretization of a and the removal of its footprint from fp
Lemma 7. For the function cons defined above and well-formed
assertions a and a′, we have
∆ {a ∗ a′}
cons(a)
{concrete(a) ∗ a′ ∧ fp = fpold \ fp(a)}
Proof. Follows from the definition of cons and Lemma 4.
We now define a function harnessΓ(r) that can generate outcall
stubs for routines r(x) of the context. This function takes a map-
ping Γ from routines to contracts, corresponding to the prototypes
of functions defined in the context. For Γ(r) = (apre, apost),
harnessΓ(r) is defined as:
routine stubr(fp, x) =
cons(apre); s := snap(fp);
res := r(x);
s′ := snap(fp); assert(s = s′);
prod(apost); res := {fp, res}
where we assume all introduced variables are fresh and snap(x)
returns a snapshot of the contents of the footprint x (corresponding
to calculating the hash of the footprint, as described in Section 4.2).
Finally, we can define the full transformation function [c]Γ,a,
using a helper function [c]′Γ, as follows:
[x := r(x)]′Γ = {fp, x} := stubr(fp, x)
where r is a routine of the context and stubr is the name of the
outcall stub routine generated by harnessΓ(r)
[c1; c2]
′
Γ = [c1]
′
Γ; [c2]
′
Γ
[if b then c1 else c2]′Γ = if b then [c1]
′
Γ else [c2]
′
Γ
[x := alloc]Γ = x := alloc; fp := add(x, fp)
[dealloc(x)]Γ = dealloc(x); fp := rem(x, fp)
[c]′Γ = c (for all other kinds of c)
The full transformation function [c]Γ,a then is
[c]Γ,a = (fp := ∅; prod(a); [c]′Γ)
One particularity to note is that our formal transformation [c]′Γ
has cases for alloc and dealloc, which were not mentioned in the
informal discussion in Section 4. This is because in practice our
hardened modules allocate and deallocate memory using the stan-
dard library functions malloc() and free(), which are assumed to
be part of the untrusted context. Hence in practice the updating of
the footprint as shown in the definition of [c]′Γ is performed auto-
matically as part of the standard transformation of outcalls. Trans-
formation rules similar to those for allocation and deallocation in
[c]′Γ could be implemented in our translator as an optimization for
trusted implementations of malloc() and free().
6.6 Safety and precision
We now come to the two crucial properties our transformation
must have: safety and precision. We first need a new definition and
lemma before we can state these main theorems.
Definition 4 (No-fail). The function nofail(∆) returns a non-
failing variant of the program ∆. That is, nofail(∆) never performs
an illegal memory access.
How nofail works is of no importance to our formalization, but
one can see that the alloced command could be used to check each
memory location before accessing it, thereby preventing failure.
Lemma 8. For a command c and well-formed assertions apre and
apost such that Γ ` {apre} c {apost}, we have
∀∆. nofail(∆)  {> ∗ apre ∧ fp = fp(apre)}
[c]′Γ
{(> ∗ apost ∧ fp = fp(apost)) ∨ trap}
Proof. The proof goes by induction on c. Since Γ ` {apre} c {apost}
implies Γ  {apre} c {apost} for all commands except routine
calls, we know that commands other than routine calls won’t fail.
We also know that the only commands that change the domain of
the heap (i.e., the symbolic footprint) are allocation and dealloca-
tion. Hence for all commands other than routine calls, allocation
and deallocation, we can immediately see that fp still correctly
contains the same footprint after the command has been executed.
For x := alloc and dealloc(x), the symbolic footprint is extended
respectively shrunk with the value of x, but the transformation [c]′Γ
modifies the runtime footprint fp accordingly. For a sequence of
commands c1; c2, the lemma follows immediately from the rule of
composition and applying the induction hypothesis to c1 and c2.
Hence the only case left to prove is routine call, for which the
transformation [c]′Γ,apre is ({fp, x} := hr(fp, y)), where hr is
the name of the stub harness as defined above. Because (1) we
assume nofail(∆), (2) snap(fp) only reads (a part of) the current
footprint and (3) Lemma 7 and Theorem 1, we can see that none
of the harness’ commands will fail. Suppose Γ(r) = (a′pre, a′post).
At entry to the harness stub, the store and heap are exactly as they
would be when calling the original function r (except for fp, which
we assume to be distinct from all program or logic variables), and
hence, according to Lemma 7, cons(a′pre) will remove the footprint
of a′pre from fp and create a corresponding program variable for
each logic variable in a′pre. The harness then takes a snapshot of the
remaining footprint, calls the original routine and checks that the
footprint hasn’t changed. If this check succeeds, we know all our
original assertions from before the function call still hold, except
those involving the footprint of a′pre. From Theorem 1, we can
see that prod(a′post) either traps or assures that concrete(a′post)
(and hence a′post) holds and adds fp(a′post) to fp, such that it now
corresponds to the footprint of apost.
This lemma leads to our safety theorem, which states that if the
context does not fail, but does not necessarily uphold its contracts
either, then the hardened module will never fail.
Theorem 2 (Safety). For any command c, environment Γ, well-
formed assertions apre and apost such that Γ ` {apre} c {apost},
and an arbitrary context ∆, we have nofail(∆)  {>} [c]Γ,apre {>}.
Proof. The definition of [c]Γ,apre is fp := ∅; prod(apre); [c]′Γ.
Hence we can first use Theorem 1 and the fact that s, h 
concrete(apre)  s ⇒ s, h  apre to see that after prod(apre)
we have either trapped or we know that > ∗ apre holds and
fp = fp(apre). The theorem then follows by applying Lemma 8.
We do not use the frame rule in this proof.
Finally, our precision theorem states that our transformations do
not change the expected behavior of the hardened module when the
context upholds its contracts.
Theorem 3 (Precision). For any command c and well-formed as-
sertions apre and apost such that Γ ` {apre} c {apost}, we have
that ∀∆. ∆  Γ⇒ ∆  {apre} [c]Γ,apre {apost}.
The ∆  Γ condition means that the context ∆ upholds the con-
tracts specified by Γ. Under standard separation logic, this means
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Figure 7. Actions performed for all types of boundary transitions.
(amongst other conditions) that context functions cannot read out-
side the footprint specified by their precondition. However, our pre-
cision theorem can actually be slightly stronger than this, because
the theorem holds even if the context is allowed to read outside its
designated footprint, as argued in Section 4.2.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on c. Under the assumption that
c does not mention fp, it is clear for all commands except routine
calls that [c]Γ,apre does not change the behavior of c. We can use
Lemma 7, Lemma 4 and the fact that s, h  concrete(apre)  
s ⇒ s, h  apre to see that the theorem also holds for routine
calls.
7. Prototype performance
We have implemented the transformations described in Section 4
as a source-to-source translator written in OCaml. This translator
takes as input a verified C module with VeriFast annotations (in-
cluding annotated function prototypes for any function of the con-
text called from the verified module), and outputs a hardened ver-
sion of the module. The translator reuses significant parts of the ex-
isting VeriFast codebase, such as its lexer, parser and typechecker.
Although VeriFast’s license prevents us from releasing the source
code at this time, a binary version of the translator is available on-
line1. The translator has been approved by the POPL Artifact Eval-
uation Committee.
In the sections below, we describe the results of measuring the
performance impact of the inserted runtime checks versus the veri-
fied module without any runtime checks. We ran micro and macro
benchmarks on a standard desktop system, without a protected
module architecture, in order to quantify the overhead of just the
runtime checks, and we discuss the additional overhead introduced
by a PMA in Section 7.3. All benchmarks were compiled with
GCC 4.8.2, using optimization level 3, and were executed on a sys-
tem with a 3.10 GHz Intel Core i5-2400 CPU with 8 GiB of RAM,
running Ubuntu 14.04. The hash function used to calculate the hash
over the footprint when performing an outcall is BLAKE2b [18].
7.1 Micro benchmarks
Since our transformations introduce checks at the boundary be-
tween the verified and unverified part, there will be a performance
overhead when crossing the verified-unverified boundary. During
a boundary check, up to three actions are performed: (1) check-
ing whether the assertion (pre- or postcondition) holds, (2) adding
or removing the assertion’s footprint from the footprint descrip-
tion maintained by the module, and (3) hashing the memory in the
module’s footprint description. Figure 7 shows which actions are
performed for each kind of boundary transition. We measured the
contribution of each of these factors using two micro benchmarks
based on simple data structures, similar to those used in [28].
The first micro benchmark is a verified module that takes as
input a linked list of integers and sorts it using insertion sort. The
1 https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/
sound-verification
e ::= n |x | e + e | e− e
c ::= x := e |x := [x] | [x] := x |x := r(x)
| if b then c else c |x := alloc | dealloc(x)
| assert(b) | alloced(x) | skip | c; c
b ::= true | false | e = e | e < e | ¬b
l, n ∈ N+ x, y, z ∈ Vars
Routine ::=routine r(x) = c
Program := P(Routine)
Figure 2. Syntax definition of our imperative language
E ::= 〈 〉 |E; c Evaluation contexts trapLoopΣ ` 〈s, h〉 | trap→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | trap
s = s ::st JeKs = n s′ = s[x→ n] ::st
varAssign
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[x := e]→ Σ ` 〈s′, h〉 | E[skip]
skip
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[skip; c]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[c]
s = s ::st JeKs = true
ifTrue
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[if e then c else c′]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[c]
s = s ::st JeKs = false
ifFalse
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[if e then c else c′]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[c′]
s = s ::st
l→ n ∈ h
s(x′) = l
s′ = s[x→ n] ::st
heapRead
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[x := [x′]]→ Σ ` 〈s′, h〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st
l→ n′ ∈ h
s(x) = l
h′ = h[l→ s(x′)]
heapWrite
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[[x] := x′]→ Σ ` 〈s, h′〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st
s′ = {x→ n} ::s
s(y) = n
Σ(r) = (routine r(x) = c)
call
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[z := r(y)]→ Σ ` 〈s′, h〉 | E[c; z := ret]
s = s ::s′ ::st s′ = s′[x→ s(‘res’)] ::st
return
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[x := ret]→ Σ ` 〈s′, h〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st
s′ = s[x→ l] ::s
l 6∈ {l′|l′ → n ∈ h}
h′ = h[l→ n′]
alloc
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[x := alloc]→ Σ ` 〈s′, h′〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st
l→ n ∈ h
s(x) = l
h′ = h \ {l→ n}
dealloc
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[dealloc(x)]→ Σ ` 〈s, h′〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st JxKs = l l 7→ n ∈ h
allocedTrue
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[alloced(x)]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st JxKs = l l 7→ n 6∈ h
allocedFalse
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[alloced(x)]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | trap
s = s ::st JbKs = true
assertTrue
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[assert b]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[skip]
s = s ::st JbKs = false
assertFalse
Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | E[assert b]→ Σ ` 〈s, h〉 | trap
Figure 3. Small-step operational semantics of our imperative language
JbKs = true h = ∅
pure
s, h  b s
JeKs = l h = {l→ n}
pointsTo
s, h  e 7→?x s[x→ n]JbKs = true s, h  P  s′
condTrue
s, h  b ? P : Q s′
JbKs = false s, h  Q s′
condFalse
s, h  b ? P : Q s′
pred p(x, y) = P
{x→ n}, h  P  s′
JeKs = n
m = s′(y)
predicate
s, h  p(e, ?z) s[z → m]
s, h1  P  s′
h1 ⊥ h2
s′, h2  Q s′′
h = h1 ∪ h2 sepConj
s, h  P ∗Q s′′
Where h1 ⊥ h2 ⇔ dom(h1) ∩ dom(h2) = ∅
s, h  P  s′
disjL
s, h  P ∨Q s′
s, h  Q s′
disjR
s, h  P ∨Q s′
s, h1  P  s′ s′, h2  Q s′′ h = h1 = h2
conj
s, h  P ∧Q s′′
pred p(x, y) = P
{x→ n}, h  P  s′
JeKs = n
s(z) = s′(y)
concrPredicate
s, h  p(e, z) s
JeKs = l h = {l→ n} s(x) = n
concrPointsTo
s, h  e 7→ x s
JeKs = n h = ∅
assign
s, h  y := e s[y → n]
top
s, h  > s
¬∃s′ : s, h  P  s′
negation
s, h  ¬P  s
s, h  P  s′
assertion
s, h  P
Figure 4. Semantics of our assertion language
assignedx(a1) ¬assignedx(a2)
assignedx(a1 ∗ a2)
¬assignedx(a1) assignedx(a2)
assignedx(a1 ∗ a2) assignedx(x := e)
assignedx(a1) assignedx(a2)
assignedx(b ? a1 : a2)
pred p(x, y) = a assignedy(a)
precise(p)
Figure 5. Precise predicates
concrete(b) = b
concrete(b ? a1 : a2) = b ? a
′
1 : a
′
2
concrete(e 7→?x) = e 7→ x
concrete(p(e, ?x)) = p(e, x)
concrete(y := e) = y = e
concrete(a1 ∗ a2) = a′1 ∗ a′2
where a′1 = concrete(a1) and a′2 = concrete(a2)
Figure 6. Definition of concrete
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Figure 8. The execution time distribution over the different run-
time checking actions for our micro benchmarks, for different in-
put lengths. The numbers above the bars indicate the total execution
time overhead in comparison to the unhardened code.
second micro benchmark is another verified module that does an
in-order traversal of a binary search tree to produce a sorted linked
list. Both modules have been verified for memory safety (i.e., not
for full functional correctness). The entry point signatures of these
two modules are as follows.
struct list_node* insertion_sort(struct list_node* l);
req list_pred(l);
ens list_pred(result);
struct list_node* bst_to_list(struct bst_node* bst);
req bst_pred(bst, ?v);
ens bst_pred(bst, v) &*& list_pred(result);
Figure 8 shows the distribution of execution time over the differ-
ent actions performed by the runtime checks for these benchmarks,
for input lengths of 101, 102, 103 and 104 elements. The number
above each bar indicates the total overhead in comparison to the
unhardened code.
The left bar chart shows that, for small input sizes, the inser-
tion sort module spends significant time modifying the footprint
description and checking assertion validity. As the input size in-
creases however, the relative overhead due to these actions drops to
the point where it becomes insignificant. This is because modifying
the footprint and checking assertion validity are O(n) operations
that are only performed when entering or exiting the module, and
insertion sort is a O(n2) algorithm. Hence, the time spent doing
useful calculations inside the module increases faster than the time
spent performing runtime checks. No time is spent on hashing, be-
cause the benchmark does not make any outcalls.
The middle bar chart shows that the BST module spends al-
most all of its time hashing its footprint, resulting in a huge per-
formance overhead that increases with increasing input size. This
is because the benchmark performs an outcall to malloc for each
node of the input BST that it visits: the memory for the output list is
allocated piece-by-piece while traversing the input. Because hash-
ing the module footprint is an O(n) operation and it is performed
n times, we have anO(n2) hashing overhead. Since the BST to list
algorithm itself is only O(n), the hashing overhead quickly domi-
nates the execution time. It is however possible to reduce the hash-
ing overhead to O(n) by using a slightly modified algorithm that
first calculates the size of input BST and then allocates memory for
the entire output list with a single malloc call. This will cause the
module footprint to be hashed only once, instead of n times. The
performance overhead of this algorithm is shown in the right bar
chart of Figure 8. While the relative overhead is still significant, it
now remains constant with increasing input size. This shows that
the choice of boundary between verified and unverified code, and
the number of times this boundary is crossed, can have a large im-
pact on performance.
7.2 Macro benchmarks
While the micro benchmarks from Section 7.1 show how the exe-
cution time overhead is distributed over the different actions per-
formed during a runtime check, they do not show the major advan-
tage of our approach: the fact that there is no performance impact
on code running completely in the verified or in the unverified part
but not transitioning between the two. To show this effect and to as-
sess the real-world feasibility of our approach, we have constructed
three realistic macro benchmarks in which we verify and harden a
small, security-critical part of an application, but leave the bulk of
the application unverified. We measured both the execution time
and memory overhead for these macro benchmarks.
7.2.1 Apache httpd modules
The first two macro benchmarks are modified Apache httpd authen-
tication modules, which are used by the web server for verifying
user credentials (for instance as part of HTTP Basic Authentica-
tion). The first Apache benchmark is based on the mod_authn_anon
module, and uses a single pair of valid username/password cre-
dentials hardcoded in memory. The other benchmark is based on
mod_authn_file, which reads the list of valid credentials from a
file on disk. Both modules provide a single entry point function
that takes client credentials (sent to the web server by the browser)
as input and returns an integer indicating whether or not they are
valid. The signatures of these functions are shown below.
int check_password_mem(char *u, char *p);
req string(u, ?user) &*& string(p, ?pass);
ens string(u, user) &*& string(p, pass) &*&
result == 1 ?
user == "username" &*& pass == "secret"
:
result == 0 ? true : result == 2;
int check_password_file(char *u, char *p);
req string(u, ?user) &*& string(p, ?pass);
ens string(u, user) &*& string(p, pass);
The modules’ code consists mainly of a number of outcalls to
various I/O and string processing functions of the standard library.
In particular, the memory-based module performs 2 such outcalls
per HTTP request, while the file-based module performs 34. As can
be seen from the signatures above, the memory-based module has
been verified for full functional correctness, while the file-based
module has only been verified for memory safety, but this makes
no difference at runtime. The path of the valid credentials file has
been hardcoded in the source of the file-based module.
We set up the pre-forked version of Apache httpd 2.4.7 to serve
the default WordPress 3.9.1 sample website with a MySQL 5.5.37
database backend. We used the Apache HTTP server benchmark-
ing tool ab to measure the time required to perform 5,000 HTTP
requests using 10 concurrent client threads. The client and server
were executed on the same host to eliminate any network bottle-
necks, and we made sure the web server did not use any form of
credential caching. The memory overhead was measured by com-
paring the peak resident set size of the modules.
The first two rows of Table 1 show the results for the Apache
benchmarks. The execution time overhead is low, averaging at
0.68% and 3.74% over three benchmarking runs for the memory-
based and file-based module respectively. The memory overhead is
also low, averaging at 0.08% and 6.60%. The difference in overhead
between the two modules is due to the different number of outcalls
they perform and because the file-based module needs a relatively
large buffer for reading lines from the password file. This buffer is
part of the module’s footprint and hence needs to be described by
the footprint description and hashed when making outcalls.
7.2.2 NetKit FTP daemon
The NetKit FTP daemon is an FTP daemon shipped with many
current Linux distributions. It contains a checkuser function that is
used to determine whether the names of users trying to log in appear
in the /etc/ftpusers file of blocked users. We have verified this
function and have moved it into a separate module, which we
then hardened with our prototype translator. The signature of this
function is shown below.
int checkuser(char *fname, char *name);
req string(fname, ?fn) &*& string(name, ?n);
ens string(fname, fn) &*& string(name, n);
The implementation of this function is quite similar to the
mod_authn_file Apache module, performing 30 outcalls to var-
ious I/O and string processing functions per FTP session. The
benchmark consists of performing 500 FTP sessions using 10 con-
current client threads, where each session consists of a user logging
in, downloading a 1 KiB file and then disconnecting again.
The third row of Table 1 shows the results obtained by taking
the average of three benchmarking runs. Both the execution time
and memory overhead are again low, confirming our claim that
real-world applications consisting mainly of unverified code plus a
small hardened module, incur only a small performance overhead.
7.3 PMA overhead
As explained in Section 3, our runtime checks assume a control-
flow safe execution model, which we propose to achieve using a
fully abstract compilation [2, 30] of the hardened source code to
a PMA. Since the micro and macro benchmarks described above
were performed on a standard desktop system without a PMA, their
results do not yet represent the overhead of our full end-to-end
approach. While recent developments [19] indicate low-overhead
hardware-based PMA platforms will be available for commodity
desktop systems in the near future, the currently available PMAs for
desktop systems are still in an experimental state, which prohibits
us from running our benchmarks on top of them.
In order to still quantify the overhead of a fully abstract compiler
and a PMA, we developed a benchmark to be run on Sancus [29],
which is a fully-functional PMA for low-end networked microcon-
trollers. The Sancus prototype consists of a fully abstract compiler
towards a small PMA-enabled 16-bit microcontroller (based on the
TI MSP430) featuring 48 KiB of ROM and 10 KiB of RAM. The
benchmark consists of a hardened module that provides a function
for calculating the median of a linked list of integers, similar to
the code example given in Section 2. The function’s precondition
asserts that the list is a valid non-empty linked list and its body per-
forms three outcalls: one to copy the list, one to sort the copy and
one to free the copy before returning. The hash function used for
this benchmark was SHA-256. The results indicate the overhead of
Sancus (both the compiler and the platform) is below 1%.
7.4 Reducing hashing overhead
The micro benchmarks show that considerable time can be spent
hashing the module’s footprint. One way of reducing this overhead
is to do away with hashing and instead copy the entire module
footprint contents to a secure location in memory (e.g., the PMA’s
private memory region) when making an outcall and to check the
footprint against this copy on return. Experiments show that this
gives a performance benefit of between 0% and 20% in comparison
with hashing, but it obviously requires much more memory.
Another potential performance issue is that, as the verified code-
base of an application grows, the size of the hardened module’s
footprint grows as well, which means more data must be hashed on
each boundary transition. However, as the verified codebase grows,
the part of the data that is used exclusively by the verified part of the
application is likely to grow as well. Hence, this data can be placed
in private memory, where it can be accessed only by the hardened
module and hence need not be hashed on boundary transitions.
An interesting way to solve both issues is by taking advantage
of hardware page protection support to reduce the amount of data
needing to be hashed on boundary transitions. If an entire memory
page is part of the module’s footprint, it can be marked read-only
in hardware before making an outcall and be reverted to read-write
access on return. However, memory pages are typically at least
4 KiB in size, making this approach too coarse-grained to be used
directly. A hybrid approach where pages that are completely in the
footprint description are set read-only and the rest of the footprint
is hashed or copied, is viable, but we consider it out of scope for
this paper.
7.5 Summary
Our micro benchmarks show that the performance overhead of the
runtime checks can be significant if there is little computation in- or
outside the verified module, compared to the computation required
for the boundary checks. Most of this overhead is due to hash-
ing the module’s footprint and adding/removing memory regions
to/from the footprint description. Nevertheless, the macro bench-
marks show that this overhead becomes negligible once more com-
putation is performed in the unverified context. Hence, when de-
Execution time (s) Peak resident set size (KiB)
unhardened hardened overhead unhardened hardened overhead
mod_authn_anon 33.164 33.388 0.224 (0.68)% 33, 356 33, 384 28 (0.08%)
mod_authn_file 33.554 34.809 1.255 (3.74)% 33, 324 35, 524 2, 200 (6.60%)
ftpd 23.193 23.242 0.049 (0.21)% 952 976 24 (2.52%)
Table 1. The macro benchmarks show a low real-world performance overhead in terms of execution time and memory consumption.
veloping modules to be verified and hardened, it is critical that the
boundary between verified and unverified code is chosen wisely.
That is, developers should try to minimize the number of veri-
fied/unverified boundary crosses in order to minimize the perfor-
mance overhead. Although we could not run our full set of bench-
marks on a PMA-enabled system, a separate benchmark performed
on Sancus indicates the platform overhead is negligible. These re-
sults demonstrate the practical feasibility of our approach.
8. Related work
Separation logic-based formal verification ensures memory safety,
which can be considered one of its main advantages for memory
unsafe languages such as C. There are however many other no-
table solutions for making C memory safe, such as Safe-C [3],
CCured [27] and Cyclone [22]. These systems rely on a combina-
tion of type system extensions, static analyses and runtime checks
to ensure memory safety, but make no attempt at providing correct-
ness guarantees beyond that. Furthermore, these solutions protect
against input-providing attackers, while we protect against more
powerful in-code attackers (i.e., attackers that have already gained
the ability to execute code in the unverified part).
The idea that software modules should specify contracts in the
form of pre- and post-conditions was popularized by Meyer [26]
in the programming language Eiffel. Such contracts can then be
checked statically or dynamically, and there is a huge amount of lit-
erature both on static and on dynamic checking of contracts. Some
notable examples include the Java Modeling Language (JML)
based tools [6], and .NET Contracts [4].
We rely on fully abstract secure compilation for providing a
control-flow safe execution platform and ensuring the soundness
of our runtime checks in the presence of code injection attacks.
Full abstraction was pioneered by Abadi [1], and has recently been
used as a basis for secure compilation to machine code [2, 30]
and JavaScript [16]. A related approach is that of TS* [35], a
gradually-typed subset of JavaScript that ensures type-safety even
when interacting with an untrusted JavaScript context. Although
the techniques used in TS* are different from our approach, this
work shares our goal of providing a robust foundation for security-
sensitive code, while still allowing interaction with an untrusted
environment. In the remainder of this section, we limit our attention
to the most relevant and closely related works.
Our approach combines modular static verification with runtime
checking, to achieve a non-trivial soundness property in the con-
text of an unsafe programming language. The approach is based on
separation logic [32] so that there is a clear notion of memory own-
ership and we can compute the footprint (i.e., the owned region of
memory) of a module and take a snapshot of that region’s contents.
For our implementation and experiments we have used the Veri-
Fast [20, 21] separation logic-based assertion language and static
program verification tool for C and Java. Other separation logic-
based program verifiers include Smallfoot [5], JStar [12], HIP [8],
and Space Invader/Infer [7]. Another notable modular static verifi-
cation tool for C programs is VCC [9]. However, instead of separa-
tion logic, it uses a verification logic that is heavily based on ghost
variables, so it is not clear how one would generate runtime checks
for module specifications written in VCC’s annotation language.
Runtime checking of separation logic assertions is known to
be challenging because of the frame rule. A related approach is
that of Nguyen et al. [28]. Although some of the techniques used
in their approach are similar to ours (e.g., tracking footprints and
splitting predicate parameters into input and output parameters),
their objective is different from ours. Their runtime checker aims
to stay as close to the standard separation logic semantics as pos-
sible, while our approach only aims to ensure that no failures can
occur in verified code. We can hence allow unverified code to read
arbitrary memory, which is not allowed under standard separation
logic. Nguyen et al. use a heap coloring technique and runtime
checks at every method invocation and field access in unverified
code to check framing. This introduces a large performance over-
head (on the order of 10, 000× if all necessary checks are done)
that increases as the size of the unverified code grows. As shown
in Section 7, the relative performance impact of our approach de-
creases with a larger unverified codebase. Also, since the imple-
mentation of Nguyen et al. needs to instrument unverified code, the
entire codebase must be recompiled, whereas we only need access
to the verified module. Finally, the implementation of Nguyen et al.
is for Java, so they do not address the complications related to the
lack of memory safety of C.
Another related approach is that of Yarra [33], in which run-
time checks are used to protect C programs from non-control data
attacks. Developers must annotate critical data structures with spe-
cial type declarations, from which point on they should only access
those data structures using those special types. In its whole pro-
gram protection mode, runtime checks are inserted throughout the
entire codebase to detect illegal accesses to the critical data struc-
tures, causing a large performance overhead. In its library protec-
tion mode however, only the memory accesses of a small core of
the application (loosely corresponding to the verified module of
our approach) are instrumented. Critical memory writes in the core
are modified to maintain a shadow copy of critical objects on sepa-
rate memory pages, which are made read-only using hardware page
protections before calling untrusted code. Critical memory reads
in the core are instrumented to check consistency of both copies,
thereby detecting unauthorized writes to critical objects from un-
trusted code. The library protection mode is similar to how we
enforce the separation logic frame rule, in the sense that critical
regions of memory are integrity protected when calling untrusted
code. Our solution provides stronger guarantees than Yarra, since
we ensure validity of arbitrary separation logic assertions, instead
of only data structure integrity. Also, Yarra does not prevent un-
trusted code from disabling the shadow page protections, making
it vulnerable to code-injection attacks in the unprotected part. Fi-
nally, although the performance cost of Yarra’s library protection
mode is low, it grows with both the number of boundary crossings
and the number of reads and writes to critical data in the core part
of the application.
Kosmatov et al. [24] described the runtime checking of E-
ACSL annotations for C programs, in the context of the Frama-C
platform. E-ACSL is an executable subset of ACSL, a behavioral
specification language for C programs. Both function contracts and
in-body annotations can be specified and can be translated into
runtime checks by the E-ACSL2C translator. In order to perform
such runtime checks, each memory allocation, deallocation and
variable assignment is instrumented to record information about the
modified region of memory into a dedicated data store. This store
hence contains a copy of the program’s data and some meta data
about it. The runtime pre, post and in-body annotation checks query
the store in order to determine the annotations’ validity. Although
the approach mentions the use of static analyses to statically discard
some of the runtime checks, there is no notion of a verified and an
unverified part. Hence, the entire program must be instrumented for
the checks to be sound and complete. This results in a high overall
performance cost, ranging from 13× to 800×.
The problem of checking contracts at the boundary between
statically checked modules and unchecked modules has also been
studied extensively in higher-order programming languages. Find-
ler and Felleisen pioneered this line of work and proposed higher-
order contracts [14], which have been implemented in the Racket
programming language [15]. The main challenge addressed is that
of function values passed over the boundary. Compliance of such
function values with their specified contract is generally undecid-
able. But it can be handled by wrapping the function with a wrap-
per that will check the contract of the function value at the point
where the function is called. This is similar to how we handle func-
tion pointers: the corresponding contract is checked when the func-
tion is called. One concern that has received extensive attention
is the proper assignment of blame once a contract violation is de-
tected [11, 17]. While this line of research shares our goal of safely
composing a statically checked module with an unchecked mod-
ule, the issues of higher order contracts and blame assignment are
largely orthogonal to the problems we address in this paper.
9. Conclusion
Separation logic-based verification of C code is a powerful tech-
nique for guaranteeing the absence of code failures. However, ver-
ifying large programs is difficult and requires significant expertise
and developer effort. Modular verification tools support partial ver-
ification, where only the most critical modules are verified, and
where over time more and more modules get verified. Unfortu-
nately, this kind of partial verification gives only limited guarantees
at runtime. Bugs in the unverified part of the program can also im-
pact the state of the verified part, and hence might trigger failures
in verified modules.
We have proposed a way to transform and compile partially
verified programs such that the runtime guarantees are significantly
better, without imposing severe performance penalties. After our
code transformations, no failures can ever occur in the verified
module; if a bug is triggered in the unverified part of the program,
this is detected before it can impact the state or control flow of the
verified module. This is useful for testing, as it detects bugs faster,
and for security as it can guarantee verified properties of modules
even in the presence of code injection attacks against the unverified
part of the program.
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